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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine the monetary policy actions through which the central 
banks in the Sub-Saharan African countries have searched to eliminate the negative impacts of 
the shocks facing their economies. We compare two types of monetary policy regimes: a 
currency board regime (in the CFA zone countries) and an inflation targeting policy regime (in 
Ghana and South Africa). We compare the properties of both policies when the central banks 
respond to three negative shocks hitting the economies: a recessionary demand shock, a supply 
shock increasing inflation and a negative fiscal shock. We propose an FPAS model (forecasting 
and monetary policy analysis system) that extends the usual FPAS models used in the literature 
to evaluate the impact of several policies in response to different types of exogenous shocks. 
We find that both policies are inappropriate to help the economies exiting from the effects of 
negative demand shocks (the adjustment relies mainly on fiscal policy), both are essential when 
negative shocks to primary balance occur (fiscal policy aggravates the negative effects of the 
shocks), while inflation targeting dominates the currency board regime as a strategy to cope 
with positive shocks to inflation.  
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1- Introduction 
 
The recent years have seen a resurgence of the debate on monetary policy regimes in Sub-
Saharan Africa, since the continent was hit by three major shocks. The first shock was a huge 
increase in the inflation rates in the wake of the increase in the energy and food price during 
the years 2006 and 2007. Two years later, 2009 began with another shock, namely a 
contraction in their GDP growth in a context of a great economic recession all over the world. 
Thirdly, the 2008-2009 international financial crisis also brought a mounting evidence of its 
negative impact on budget deficits and public debt ratio, through several channel: cuts in 
foreign aid, a decrease in some commodity prices and a drop of fiscal revenues.  
These events have placed the issue of policy-mix back on the policy agenda. Before the recent 
great recession, the policymakers in Africa subscribed to the view that central banks had to 
focus on the control of inflation, with fiscal policy more or less passive (governments had to 
come up to fiscal sustainability by checking budget surpluses and a rapid decrease in their 
public debt ratio). However, the disappointments with passive policies when the economies are 
hit by severe exogenous shocks gave a renewed support to the idea that the harmful effects of 
the shock on the economies could be reduced under activism rather than under “laissez faire”. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the monetary policy actions through which the central 
banks in the Sub-Saharan African countries have searched to eliminate the negative impacts of 
the shocks facing the economies. We compare two types of monetary policy regimes: a 
currency board regime and an inflation targeting policy regime. In both cases, the monetary 
policy framework is that of nominal anchors. The difference is that in the first case, the 
domestic currency is tied to a foreign currency, while a domestic expectations-based anchor is 
chosen in the second case. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa only two countries have chosen to officially adopt an inflation targeting 
policy: Ghana since May 2007 and South Africa since February 2000. The latter conducts a 
flexible inflation targeting aiming at stabilizing both inflation and output around some targets. 
The former pursues a hybrid strategy based on flexible inflation targeting but simultaneously 
seeks to manage the path of the exchange rate. A flexible currency board regime has been 
adopted by a group of countries since more than 60 years. The WAEMU countries have a 
common currency, the CFA Franc which is backed by the French Treasury through a 
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mechanism called the “Compte d’opérations” 5. France guarantees the conversion of the CFA 
Francs into euros unlimitedly and permanently, by making advances to the central bank. As a 
consequence the creation of domestic money is controlled by a set of rules that amount to 
partially backing the domestic currency on foreign reserves.  
In this paper, we compare the properties of both policies when the central banks respond to 
three negative shocks hitting the economies: a recessionary demand shock, a supply shock 
increasing inflation and a negative fiscal shock. The effects of such shocks have received a 
great attention in the policy circles over the last years. In order to capture the key transmission 
channels relevant to analyzing the CB’s interventions under each monetary regime, we propose 
an FPAS model (forecasting and monetary policy analysis system) that extends the usual FPAS 
models used in the literature to evaluate the impact of several policies in response to different 
types of shocks (see Berg et al., 2006, Laxton et al. 2009). Compared to DSGE models, the 
FPAS models have been used to forecast inflation by the central bankers, by virtue of their 
simplicity, tractability and their understandable structure. Furthermore, they have proven to 
have reasonable empirical properties. The core framework features a small open new 
Keynesian economy with rational expectations with four behavioral equations: an aggregate 
demand curve, a Phillips curve, an exchange rate equation and an uncovered parity condition.  
We extend the core framework by introducing some specificities of the three economies: the 
importance of lending conditions in the credit market, the role of government budget 
constraints through a fiscal reaction function adapted to the African countries, a Taylor rule 
which incorporates an objective of real exchange rate stabilization and a flexible currency 
board rule. The coefficients of the model are calibrated (not estimated) in such a way that the 
values simulated of the endogenous variables replicate their historical values between 2002 and 
2012.  
A first contribution of this paper is the analysis of the monetary policy reaction to shocks in a 
context of policy-mix. Typically, previous papers analyzing the monetary policy stabilization 
policy in the African countries under either inflation targeting and currency board regimes 
neglect the role of the fiscal policy actions and constraints. The only way in which the 
5 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) consists of eight countries which share the same 
currency, the CFA Franc: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
Their central bank (the Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest, BCEAO) manages the common monetary 
policy.  
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interaction between monetary and fiscal policies is regarded is through fiscal dominance6.  
Here, we do not assume any kind of fiscal dominance. Instead, we consider that the issue of 
sound government finances is central in the African countries policy circles, thereby implying 
that the fiscal authorities can be forced to adopt fiscal consolidation policies (to reduce the 
public debt ratio) even in circumstances where the economies are hit by negative shocks. In 
such circumstances, several configurations of the policy-mix in response to negative shocks 
can emerge.  
In some cases, we retrieve a well-known result in the literature that the cost of an inflation 
targeting policy can be an increase in the public debt ratio, if both monetary and fiscal policies 
are countercyclical. In other situations, monetary or fiscal policies are alternatively harmful 
(because they aggravate the negative effects of the shocks) and therefore the stabilization of the 
output and/or inflation rely on the other policy. For instance when the economies experience 
cost-push shocks that raise the inflation rate, the reaction of the central banks (cutting the 
interest rate or reducing the liquidity in the banking system) needs to be counteracted by 
expansive fiscal policies to dampen the negative impact of the restrictive monetary policy on 
the economies. Another example, when the countries face a negative demand shock, the 
currency board regime is ill-advised in terms of helping to slow down the GDP decline, 
because the countercyclical policy needed to attenuate the impact of the shock relies entirely on 
fiscal policy.  
A second contribution of the paper is to highlight the importance of the real exchange rate in 
the Taylor rule in determining the speed of dissipation of the negative shocks. Ghana and South 
Africa, though they have both adopted a policy of inflation targeting, differ on one important 
point. In the latter, the interest rate is the unique instrument of monetary policy. In the former, 
the setting of the interest level according to the inflation gap is complemented by interventions 
in the foreign exchange markets to match the real exchange rate and its target. This means that, 
in practice, in Ghana monetary policy works with two instruments: discretionary changes in the 
CB’s discount rate and indirect changes stemming from the variations of the foreign reserves 
(which impact the monetary aggregates and in turn the market interest rates). The negative 
shocks in the economy are accommodated more rapidly with two instruments than with only 
one.  
6 See for instance Fraga et al. (2003). 
4 
 
                                                          
A third contribution is that the currency board regime can be totally de-stabilizing when the 
central bank search to react to a shock raising inflation. In this case, the right adjustment of the 
macroeconomic variables for the shock to die out relies on fiscal policy.   
Finally, we find that both the inflation targeting and currency board regimes help stabilizing 
the inflation rate and the output following a negative shock on the primary balance. They act as 
a substitute to restrictive fiscal policies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we extend the standard 
framework of FPAS model to study the reaction of monetary policy to adverse shock.  Section 
3 contains the analysis of the reaction of monetary policies to different negative shocks. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2- An open-economy FPAS model for Ghana, South Africa and the WAEMU  
 
The baseline FPAS model with rational expectations is composed of four behavioral 
equations: an aggregate demand curve, a Phillips curve, an exchange rate equation and an 
uncovered parity condition. In this paper the core framework is extended to incorporate some 
specificities of the three economies: the importance of lending conditions in the credit market, 
the role of government budget constraints through a fiscal reaction function adapted to the 
African countries, a Taylor rule which incorporates an objective of real exchange rate 
stabilization and a flexible currency board rule. 
We consider a rational expectations system that determine the dynamics of the domestic 
aggregate output 𝑦𝑡, the ratio of primary balance to GDP 𝑏𝑡, the inflation rate 𝜋𝑡, the real 
exchange rate 𝑧𝑡, domestic credit 𝐶𝑡, net foreign assets 𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑡, the real exchange rate 𝑟𝑡, and 
debt ratio 𝑑𝑡. We consider the following variables as exogenous: foreign aid, 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡, net transfers 
from abroad 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑡, terms of trade 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡, foreign output and net foreign assets, 𝑦𝑡𝑊, 𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑡, the 
world real interest rate 𝑟𝑡𝑊 and the French interest rate 𝑟𝑡
𝑓.  
The model is a New Keynesian model of aggregate demand and aggregate supply describing 
a small open economy with rational expectations. External demand shocks are captured in a IS 
curve, while unexpected changes in foreign prices are assumed to impact the domestic prices 
through a real exchange channel. The interest rate transmission channel to the economy is 
introduced through a bank lending channel, in order to capture the constraints faced by the 
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private sector in domestic capital markets which are characterized by a high banking 
intermediation. We finally consider that a world depression can be a source of potential shock 
to the economy through fiscal shock (the African countries are aid recipients and the donors 
lend funds in proportion to their revenues. Therefore an economic recession in the 
industrialized countries reduces the amount of aid available to the African countries and this in 
turn increases their primary deficits).  
Furthermore, we do not introduce the usual condition of uncovered interest rate parity. Indeed, 
Ghana and the WAEMU have a relatively limited level of integration with the international 
capital markets. South Africa exerts a de facto control on inflows and outflows of capital.  
As is standard in the literature, we present a model in log-linearized form with the variables of 
interest expressed in terms of deviations from their equilibrium level.   
 
2.1.- Aggregate demand  We consider a forward-looking equation that combines several aspects of the literature on the 
transmission mechanisms of the different determinants of aggregate demand. The equation in 
expressed in terms of the output-gap. The micro foundations for relating the current and future 
output are standard (log-linear approximation of a model of representative consumer with an 
intertemporal CES utility function where consumption is equal to aggregate demand). We also 
consider irrational expectations by introducing partially backward-looking expectations. Rather 
than directly introducing the interest rate as a determinant of the aggregate demand, we 
consider a bank-lending channel à la Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Any change in the central 
bank discount rate induces changes in bank deposits and bank lending, thereby influencing 
domestic credits and then the output. This can be motivated in the standard micro models by 
assuming that a consumer faces a borrowing constraint that influence his intertemporal 
substitution behavior in lieu of the interest rate. Government fiscal balance also enters as a key 
determinant of demand as well as foreign demand. The equation is as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + (1 − 𝛽1)(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑡−1∗ ) + 𝛽3(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡∗)                          −𝛽4(𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡∗) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡∗) + 𝛽6(𝑦𝑡𝑊 − 𝑦𝑡𝑊∗) + 𝜀𝑡𝑦  (1) 
𝜀𝑡
𝑦 = 𝜑𝑦𝜀𝑡−1𝑦 + 𝜈𝑡𝑦      , 𝜈𝑡𝑦 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎2) 
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where (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗) is the domestic output-gap,  (𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡∗) is the real exchange rate gap, (𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡∗) 
is the fiscal gap and 𝑏𝑡 is the primary balance as share of  GDP, (𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡∗) is the lending gap 
and (𝑦𝑡𝑊 − 𝑦𝑡𝑊∗) is the world output-gap. A decrease in 𝑧𝑡 represents a real appreciation. 
𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 means the expectation made at time t of the future value of a variable 𝑥 at time t+1. A 
star indicates the equilibrium value of a variable. We assume that 0 < 𝛽1 < 1 (an expected 
future income yields an increase in current demand), 𝛽3 > 0 (a depreciation raises the output), 
𝛽6 > 0 (the domestic and foreign business cycles are synchronized). 𝜀𝑡𝑦 is a demand shock with 
a variance 𝜎𝑦2/1 − 𝜑𝑦.  
There are several motivations for considering domestic credit as a determinant of aggregate 
demand. In forward-looking IS equations, it is the long-run interest rate, rather than the short-
run interest rate, that matters to account for intertemporal substitution behaviors. Changes in 
the money base (and thus in domestic credit) can be used as a proxy for the long-run rates. 
Another motivation is the bank-lending channel as we already mentioned above. Indeed, any 
change in the central bank’s discount rate shifts the supply of loans by the commercial banks 
and in turn affect the output. It is assumed that 𝛽5 > 0 (an increase in the ratio of domestic 
credit as share of GDP raises the output).  
 
2.2.- Bank-lending channel and domestic credit 
Given the high level of banking intermediation in Ghana, South Africa and WAEMU 
countries, we propose to interpret the presence of the credit gap in the aggregate demand 
equation as reflecting a bank lending channel, in the case of Ghana and South Africa, and as 
the consequence of loans to depository institutions in the case of the WAEMU countries.  
In Ghana and South Africa, the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP, 
𝐶𝑡,  depends upon the short-run interest rate (bank lending channel) and upon banks’ 
expectations of future output-gap: 
 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡∗ = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡∗) + 𝛿2(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜀𝑡𝐶 (2a) 
𝜀𝑡
𝑐 = 𝜑𝑐𝜀𝑡−1𝑐 + 𝜈𝑡𝑐      , 𝜈𝑡𝑐 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎2) 
𝑟𝑡 is the real interest rate defined as the central bank’s nominal interest rate minus the expected 
inflation rate, 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1, where 𝑖𝑡 is the nominal interest rate and 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation rate 
between time t-1 and t. 𝑟𝑡∗ is the interest rate corresponding to the long-run equilibrium of the 
7 
 
interest rate. We assume that 𝛿1>0 (banks’ borrowing cost in the money market reduces the 
profitability of their loan activity, thereby implying a decrease in domestic credit). The second 
term in the right-hand side of the equation indicates that the subjective beliefs of the loan 
officers in the banks about the future economic conditions are a leading indicator for the 
cyclicality in the lending activity. This second term captures the Minsky Financial instability 
hypothesis to explain busts and booms in the credit cycle (for a recent paper, see Battacharya et 
al., 2011). We assume that 𝛿2 > 0. 𝜀𝑡𝐶 is a shock stemming from the banking sector (for 
instance a credit crunch if the shock is negative) with a variance 𝜎𝐶2/1 − 𝜑𝑐.  
In the case of the WAEMU countries, as explained below, monetary policy functions like a 
fixed-exchange rate regime (or flexible currency board) with a limited role for the interest rate 
which evolves like the French discount rate. Domestic credit depends upon the central bank’s 
loans to depository institutions which are reflected in the changes in domestic assets. Denoting 
the domestic assets by 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡, we have  
 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡∗ = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1(𝑎𝑡) + 𝛿2(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜀𝑡𝐶 (2b) 
where 𝑎𝑡 = � 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝐹𝑡� (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1) and 𝐹𝑡 is foreign reserves. An increase in the 
domestic assets held by the central bank (weighted by the ratio of these assets over the money 
supply) resulting from higher loans to the banking sector raises credits made by the banking 
sector. Therefore 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 are both positive. 
 
2.3.- Fiscal policy and debt dynamics 
The introduction of a public finance variable in the aggregate demand equation is standard. 
The novelty here is that this variable is endogenous. Indeed, in the African countries fiscal 
space is used for increasing public spending that are expected to exert a positive effect on 
growth (health, education, infrastructure)7. Among the different ways of creating fiscal space, 
the countries often face the following three alternatives: reducing spending in low-priority 
areas, increasing aid inflows such as grants or official development assistance, reducing their 
debt ratio or pushing it to a more sustainable level, increasing domestic revenues. Further, the 
empirical literature shows that changes in the terms of trade can increase the fiscal 
vulnerability of countries that are exporters of commodities. All these elements are considered 
7 For an example, see Gottschalk et al. (2009).  
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in the following equation in which the fiscal gap is defined by assuming that the fiscal 
authorities adjust the ratio of primary budget balance 𝑏𝑡 in response to the deviation of the 
expectation of debt ratio 𝑑𝑡 from its sustainable level 𝑑𝑡∗, foreign aid 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡, the output gap and 
the inflation gap  
𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡
∗ = 𝜃0 + 𝜃2(𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜃3𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃4(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗) + 𝜃5(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡𝑏  (3) 
𝜀𝑡
𝑏 = 𝜑𝑏𝜀𝑡−1𝑏 + 𝜈𝑡𝑏      , 𝜈𝑡𝑏 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎2) 
We assume that 𝜃2 > 0 (we have fiscal sustainability in the sense of Trehan and Walsh, 
1991), 𝜃3 > 0 (any grant is a non-fiscal revenue that improves the primary balance), 𝜃4 > 0 
(fiscal policy is countercyclical) and 𝜃5 > 0 (an increase in the terms of trade improves the 
fiscal balance). 𝜀𝑡𝑏 is a fiscal shock with a variance𝜎𝑏. A negative shock reflects different 
situations: the possibility that grants are withdrawn or diminished (therefore requiring a fiscal 
adjustment from the recipient government) or a decrease in external borrowing.  
 In the equation above 𝑑𝑡 is endogenous and described by the standard recursive equation 
governing the dynamics of the debt ratio: 
  𝑑𝑡 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑏𝑡,   (4) 
where 𝜆 is the average value of the discrepancy between the public debt interest rate and the 
real GDP growth rate (divided by 1 plus the real GDP growth rate). We take the average, over 
the years 2002-2011. One important question concerns the sign of 𝜆. In Ghana and the 
WAEMU countries, a high proportion of their debt is external debt with a debt service 
contracted at concessional levels (very low interest rates). Therefore, 𝜆 can be approximated by 
the ratio −𝑔/(1 + 𝑔), where 𝑔 is the average of the growth rate of the real GDP. Therefore 
𝜆 < 0. Based on previous empirical studies on the fiscal reaction function for South Africa, we 
also assume that 𝜆 < 0 (see Burger et al., 2012).  
 We define 𝑏𝑡∗ as the long-run value of the sustainable primary balance defined as 𝑏𝑡∗ = 𝜆𝑑𝑡∗, 
where 𝑑𝑡∗ the targeted debt ratio.  
2.4.- Aggregate supply 
 Aggregate supply is described by a Phillips curve that combines a backward-looking 
acceleration equation and the expectations of future inflation. The micro foundation is for 
instance Roberts (1997), which encompasses the standard backward-looking model (𝛼1 = 0) 
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and forward-looking models in which imperfect information or rigidities are introduced (see 
Taylor, 1980, Rotemberg, 1982):  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑚0 + (1 −𝑚1){𝛼1𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼3(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)} + 𝑚1(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡𝜋       (5) 
𝜀𝑡
𝜋 = 𝜑𝜋𝜀𝑡−1𝜋 + 𝜈𝑡𝜋      , 𝜈𝑡𝜋 ∼ 𝜇(0,𝜎2) 
𝜀𝑡
𝜋 is a cost-push shock with a variance 𝜎𝜋2/1 − 𝜑𝜋.  
The additional point here is that we include the real exchange rate as an explanatory variable in 
the equation to account for the real exchange rate pass-through. 𝜋𝑡+1∗  is the inflation target for 
time t+1 set by the central bank and we assume that monetary policy is credible 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 =
𝜋𝑡+1
∗ . We assume incomplete pass-through (0 < 𝑚1 < 1). In this partially forward-looking 
Phillips curve, we assume that the consumer price inflation is the result of domestic inflation 
and foreign inflation with 𝛼1 > 0, 𝛼2 > 0, 𝛼3 > 0.  
 
2.5.- Monetary policy 
 
Case 1. - The WAEMU countries: a flexible currency board regime 
 The institutional restrictions on money creation in the WAEMU countries are such that the 
monetary system functions like a flexible currency board regime. The functioning of the 
Compte d’Opérations implies that money stock is partially back by foreign currency reserves. 
In the long-run the money stock must grow at the same rate as in the anchor country (the euro 
area), changes in the foreign reserves reflects balance of payments surpluses or deficits. The 
money stock is defined like in a system of fixed exchange rates: 
  𝑀𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝐹𝑡 + 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡) (6a) 
where 𝐹𝑡 is foreign reserves and ℎ𝑡 is the money multiplier. Any discrepancy between the 
growth rate of money stock ∆𝑀𝑡 and its target ∆𝑀𝑡∗  is a consequence of changes in the balance 
of payments implying changes in foreign reserves. The central bank can sterilize the effect on 
money stock by adjusting the amount of the domestic assets. A sterilization policy is thus 
reflected by −∆𝐹𝑡 = 𝜗∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡, with 𝜗 = 1, in case of complete monetary autonomy. The 
central bank’s behavior is therefore described by the following reduced form equation which is 
familiar in the models of the monetary approach to the balance of payments: 
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 𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎0 − 𝜑1𝑓𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑1)�𝜑2(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1) + 𝜑3�𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1� + 𝜑4ℎ𝑡 + 𝜑5𝜋𝑡� + 𝜀𝑡𝑎 (6b) 
𝜀𝑡
𝑎 = 𝜑𝑎𝜀𝑡−1𝑎 + 𝜈𝑡𝑎      , 𝜈𝑡𝑎 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎2) 
where 𝑓𝑡 = � 𝐹𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+𝐹𝑡� (𝐹𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡−1). The presence of both the real interest rate and the real 
output in this equation is motivated by the fact that the target money stock is the money stock 
that equals the money people desire to hold (money demand). We assume that monetary policy 
is transparent and credible, so that the agents in the economy want to hold the amount of 
money for which the growth rate of money stock does not systematically deviate from that of 
the reserve currency country (in our case the euro area countries). In this case ∆𝑀𝑡∗ is a function 
of the changes of determinants of money demand, typically the real income, the nominal 
interest rate and the inflation rate. By using the fisher relationship, that relates the nominal and 
real interest rates, we can substitute the real interest rate to the nominal interest rate. 𝜀𝑡𝑎 is a 
shock on the domestic assets with a variance 𝜎𝑎/1 − 𝜑𝑎. The nominal interest rate is assumed 
to be that of France, since in previous studies it has been shown that the WAEMU discount rate 
and the French rate are highly correlated (see Dufrénot, 2011). But the real rates may differ. 
Depending upon the values of the parameter 𝜑1, we have several configurations of the degree 
of monetary autonomy. If 𝜑1 = 1, then the central bank keeps perfect control over the money 
base. If 𝜑1 = 0, then, there is no monetary policy autonomy. Previous empirical papers in the 
literature have shown that in the case of the WAEMU countries we have partial monetary 
policy autonomy with 𝜑1 = 0.7 (see Veyrune, 2007). Since we do not have a strict currency 
board and that only a fraction of the BCEAO’s foreign reserves must be backed by foreign 
reserves, changes in the foreign components of the money supply will result in a less than 
proportionate change in the domestic component. The sign of the other parameters depends 
upon the impact of the other explanatory variables on money demand: 𝜑2 > 0, 𝜑3 < 0, 𝜑4 <0, 𝜑5 > 0.  
 Finally, the real exchange rate is endogenous and its dynamics is influenced by the 
determinants of the relative prices (domestic versus foreign prices). The determinants of the 
real exchange rates in the WAEMU countries have been extensively studied in the empirical 
literature (see, among others, Dufrénot and Yehoue, 2005, Abdih and Tsangarides, 2010, 
Roudet et al., 2007). Core factors affecting the long run and short-run real exchange rates are 
the terms of trade 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡, government spending, the primary balances 𝑏𝑡, the degree of openness 
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡, the relative productivity 𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 (domestic relative to foreign): 
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  𝑧𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝜔3𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 (6c) 
where 𝜀𝑡𝑧is a real exchange shock and we assume that 𝜔1 < 0,𝜔2 > 0,𝜔3 > 0. Indeed, a 
higher openness induces higher external imbalances that are corrected through a depreciation; 
higher terms of trade yield to an appreciation due an increase in the price of non-traded goods; 
an increase in the relative productivity yields a real appreciation (Balassa-Samuelson effect).  
𝜔4 can be either positive or negative depending upon whether higher government spending is 
directed towards traded or non-traded goods.  
 
Case 2. – Ghana and South-Africa: an inflation targeting policy 
Monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule in an open economy, with the exchange rate gap 
as an additional variables to the usual inflation and output-gap8. The central bank adjusts its 
discount rate according to the relative importance given to the inflation target and to the real 
activity: 
 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡∗ = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1(𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝜋𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜌2(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜌3(𝑧𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑡−1∗ ) + 𝜀𝑡𝑟 (7a) 
𝜀𝑡
𝑟 = 𝜑𝑟𝜀𝑡−1𝑟 + 𝜈𝑡𝑟      , 𝜈𝑡𝑟 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎2) 
where 𝜋𝑡∗ is the targeted inflation announced by the central bank at time t to prevail at time t+1, 
and 𝑟𝑡∗ is the real interest rate corresponding to the targeted inflation. Both countries have 
adopted a regime of managed float, which implies that𝜌3 ≠ 0. We assume that the central bank 
responds to depreciation by raising the interest rate and vice versa. We therefore have 𝜌3 > 0. 
The interest rate is also raised in response to an expected inflation rate above the target and 
expected output-gap above its long-run value (𝜌1,𝜌2 > 0).  Theoretically, due to so called 
Trilemma, the monetary authorities cannot adopt an independent monetary policy while 
achieving at the same time a stable exchange rate under the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility. However, it is known from the literature that some countries that adopted IT also 
intervene in foreign exchange markets. This is the case of Ghana and South Africa.    
 The real exchange rate is described by an equation like (6c), but we add the interest rate 
differential to account for the impact of capital and financial flows on the nominal (and thus 
real) exchange rate: 
8 See Taylor (2001). 
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 𝑧𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝜔3𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏𝑡 + 𝜔5(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐹) + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 (7b) 
where 𝜔1 > 0,𝜔2 < 0,𝜔3 < 0, 𝜔4 < 0,𝜔5 > 0. 𝑟𝑡𝐹 is the foreign interest rate (USA).  
We further assume that 𝜀𝑡𝑧 = 𝜑𝑧𝜀𝑡−1𝑧 + 𝜈𝑡𝑧      , 𝜈𝑡𝑧 ∼ 𝑁(0,𝜎2). 
 To sum up, the simulations are done using three models that consist of the following 
equations: 
 -for the WAEMU countries: (1), (2b), (3), (4), (5), (6b), (6c). 
 -for Ghana and South Africa: (1), (2a), (3), (4), (5), (7a), (7b). 
We assume that all shocks are AR (1) processes.   
3- Analyzing the effects of different shocks 
3.1- Solving the model 
 
Our models can be casted into a second order multivariate model: 
𝐵0𝑌𝑡= 𝐴0+ 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1+ D𝑋𝑡 + C𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1 + 𝑈𝑡     ,     𝑈𝑡 = 𝛷𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑡               (9) 
where 𝐵0, 𝐵1 , C are 7x7 matrices, D is a 7x10 for Ghana and South Africa and 7x12 for 
WAEMU. 𝑣𝑡 is a vector of iid innovations. 𝐴0 and E are 7x10 vectors containing respectively 
the constants and the shocks. The exact expressions of the matrices are given in appendix 1. 
The vectors of variables are defined as follows: 
For Ghana and South Africa: 
𝑌𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝑏�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝜋�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, Δ𝑧𝑡), 𝐸𝑡 , = (𝜀𝑡𝑦, 𝜀𝑡𝑐, 𝜀𝑡𝑏 , 0, 𝜀𝑡𝜋, 𝜀𝑡𝑟 , 𝜀𝑡𝑧) 
𝑋𝑡 , = (𝑦𝑡𝑤,𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡,𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡,𝜋𝑡∗, 𝜀?̃?−1, 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡- 𝑟𝑡𝑓, 𝑏𝑡∗, 𝑧𝑡∗) 
For WAEMU: 
𝑌𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝑏�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝜋�𝑡, 𝑎𝑡, Δ𝑧𝑡),             𝐸𝑡 , = (𝜀𝑡𝑦 , 𝜀𝑡𝑐, 𝜀𝑡𝑏 , 0, 𝜀𝑡𝜋, 𝜀𝑡𝑎, 𝜀𝑡𝑧) 
𝑋𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡𝑤,𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡,𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡,𝜋𝑡∗, 𝜀?̃?−1, 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡, 𝑓𝑡, ℎ𝑡, 𝑏𝑡∗, Δ𝑟𝑡 𝑧𝑡∗) 
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𝑌𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables; 𝑋𝑡 is the vector of exogenous variables; 𝐸𝑡is the 
vector of shocks. A solution can be found using the method of undetermined coefficients. 
We define: 
𝑒𝑡 =  𝑌𝑡 −  𝑃𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑒0      
where P is a matrix to be determined and which has full rank 
Substituting this into (9) we get: 
𝐵0(𝑒𝑡 +  𝑃𝑌𝑡−1 −  𝑒0)= 𝐴0+ 𝐵1𝑦𝑌𝑡−1+ Δ𝑋𝑡 + C𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝑡+1 +  𝑃𝑌𝑡 −  𝑒0) + 𝑈𝑡  
                        = 𝐴0+ 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1+ Δ𝑋𝑡 + C𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 - C𝐸𝑡𝑒0+ C𝐸𝑡{𝑃(𝑃𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑡 −  𝑒0)}+ 𝑈𝑡 
                       = 𝐴0+ 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1+ Δ𝑋𝑡 + C𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 - C𝐸𝑡𝑒0+ C𝑃2𝑦𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑃𝑒𝑡 −  𝑐𝑃𝑒0+ 𝑈𝑡     (10) 
To eliminate 𝑌𝑡−1 and the constant term we need the following two conditions: 
𝐵𝑃 − 𝐵1 −  𝐶𝑃𝑃 = 0                        and                      𝑒0 =  𝐴0(𝐶𝑃 − 𝐶 − 𝐵0)−1                
This yields: 
𝐵0𝑒𝑡 = 𝐶𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 +  𝐷𝑋𝑡 +  𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡             (11)                                                                       
which implies: 
𝑒𝑡 =  (𝐵0 − 𝐶𝑃)−1𝐶𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 + (𝐵0 − 𝐶𝑃)−1∆Xt +  (𝐵0 − 𝐶𝑃)−1Ut 
or:  
𝑒𝑡 =  𝜋1𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 +  𝜋2∆𝑋𝑡 + 𝜋3𝑈𝑡 
Solving recursively, we obtain: 
𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝜋1𝑗𝐸𝑡[𝜋2𝑋𝑡+𝑗 + 𝜋3𝑈𝑡+𝑗]∞𝑗=0         (12) 
Since 𝑈𝑡 =  𝛷𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑡  where 𝑣𝑡  is a vector of i.i.d. process with zero mean, we have the 
following moving average  MA(∞) representation: 
𝑈𝑡+𝑗 = 𝑈1 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖𝑣𝑡+𝑗=𝑖∞𝑖=0                    (13) 
Replacing in (12) using the definition of  𝑒𝑡 , we obtain the general solution: 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝑃𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜋1𝑗𝐸𝑡{𝜋2𝑋𝑡+𝑗∞𝑗=0 + 𝜋3 ∑ 𝛷𝑖𝑣𝑡+𝑗−𝑖 +∞𝑖=0 𝜋3𝑈1}  (14) 
where 𝑋𝑡 is assumed to be exogenous with the expected value provided by the historical data. 
To find a value of P9 that satisfy the quadratic equation 𝐵𝑃 = 𝐵1 + 𝐶𝑃𝑃, we use a generalized 
scheme decomposition. Once P is obtained, we get 𝑒0 by replacing in 𝑒0 =  𝐴0(𝐶𝑃 − 𝐶 −
𝐵0)−1. The values retained for the calibration of the parameters of the model yield a solution 
which is unique and stationary.  
 
3.2- Model calibration and solution  
 
 We calibrate the model to match the key macroeconomic features of the three economies 
over the last 10 years from 2002 to 2012. 10 years is reasonable to avoid structural instability 
in the parameters. We therefore do not calibrate the model over a too long period. Moreover, 
we examine the dynamic effects of different shocks that occurred within the recent ten years. 
These include supply shocks such as the surge in the energy and food prices in 2006 and 2007, 
financial and recession shocks from 2008 onwards. The calibrated parameters for the different 
equations and countries are reported in Tables B1 till B3, in Appendix 2. Some values are 
chosen from previous studies in the literature.   
 A first issue is the determination of the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. 𝑧𝑡∗ 
and 𝐶𝑡∗ are assumed to be constant and equal to the average values of the real effective 
exchange rate and net domestic credit as share of GDP between 2002 and 2011. The debt ratio 
equilibrium value 𝑑𝑡∗ is set to 70% for WAEMU and Ghana. This corresponds to WAEMU’s 
public debt target in the Stability and Convergence Pact. Though, Ghana is not a member of the 
WAEMU area, the country is expected to belong to a common monetary area in the 
forthcoming years and this will require a convergence of macroeconomic policies between the 
WAEMU and WAMZ countries10. We therefore set the target debt ratio at the same level as for 
the WAEMU countries. This implies a negative benchmark for the primary balance 𝑏𝑡∗ of -4% 
for Ghana and -2% for WAEMU. Since there is no explicit announced target for the ratio of 
9 The solution for P for the three countries can be found in Appendix 1. 
10 The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) was formed in 2000 and is a group of 6 countries in West Africa 
that plan to have a common currency with the WAEMU countries by the year 2020. These countries are the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone.  
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debt to GDP in South Africa, we have to rely on an ad-hoc assumption. From the South 
African Reserve bank’s and South African Ministry of Finance’ reports and the IMF regional 
economic outlook from 2002 onwards, it is usually considered that a debt ratio below 50% is a 
sustainable level. This implies that the benchmark value for the ratio of primary deficit is -
1.7%. The inflation target is set to 2% for WAEMU (similar to the implicit target in the euro 
area given that the CFA Franc is anchored on the Euro), 6% for South Africa (the upper limit 
of the inflation target band (as shown by Klein (2012); though the official target is between 3% 
and 6%, the central bank seems to have aimed for the upper bound) and 5% for Ghana 
(medium-term goal since the inflation targeting policy has been formally adopted in 2007). 
Finally, the long-run interest rate is set to the average of the period 2007-2011 for Ghana and 
WAEMU and the average of the period 2002-2011 for South Africa. For Ghana and South 
Africa, we compute the average since the year of adoption of the inflation target policy.  
 
3.3 Impulse response functions to different shocks 
 
We compute the impulse response functions corresponding to the following shocks:  
• A negative demand shock on 𝜀𝑡
𝑦, for instance a recession as occurred during the years 
2008-2009 in the aftermath of the subprime crisis; 
• A positive shock to 𝜀𝑡𝜋, representing inflationary pressure stemming for instance from 
currency depreciation, higher inflation expectations or cost-push shock as was the case 
during the surge in oil and food prices that happened in 2006-2007. 
• A negative shock on 𝜀𝑡𝑏, representing negative side effects for the African countries of 
the international crisis (reduction in foreign aid, negative terms of trade shocks 
occurring through the external account changes); 
Each shock is introduced as a standard deviation of 1. The variables are shown in terms of 
deviations from their steady state.  
The question of which policy-mix should be preferred –fiscal and inflation targeting versus 
fiscal and currency board policies – can be examined according to different criteria. We deal 
with this issue by considering jointly the variability of the macroeconomic indicators, the 
capacity of the policies in absorbing the shocks rapidly (by limiting their persistence) and their 
stabilizing properties (whether they induce changes in the variables in the right direction). By 
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persistence, we mean the length of time before a given change – relative to its equilibrium 
value - in a variable vanishes. The concept of variability adopted here is not statistical, but 
interpreted with a policy perspective. For instance, a policy-mix with a fiscal policy boosting 
production and a monetary policy leading to a contraction of the output is considered as 
involving a lower variability of the output than a policy-mix with both policies changing the 
output in the same direction. We further propose to compare the monetary policy regimes by 
considering their cost in terms of public debt ratio (which is a key concern for the Sub-Saharan 
African countries).  
 
3.3.1 Reactions to a negative demand shock 
 
South Africa and Ghana 
The effects are depicted in Figures 1 till 3. A negative demand shock (contraction in aggregate 
demand) yields a decrease in the expected production under its equilibrium level. This pushes 
the expected inflation rate below its target (negative output and inflation gaps) and triggers a 
countercyclical reaction from both the central bank and the government. The central bank 
reacts by cutting the interest rate and the government increases the primary deficits (negative 
fiscal gap). The reduced interest yields a higher amount of credits (positive credit gap) and a 
depreciation of the exchange rate (negative exchange rate gap). These two effects boost growth 
and raise inflation. The reduced fiscal gap is equivalent to an increase in public demand that 
ignite the negative impact of the shock on output. During the transition from the initial impact 
of the shock to the final restoration of equilibrium, the economy experiences an increase in the 
debt ratio.  
 
WAEMU 
A negative demand shock reduces production below its equilibrium level as shown in Figure 4. 
This yields a decrease in money demand. The CB validates this decrease by reducing money 
supply after the shock. It does so by selling assets in the money market and this is equivalent to 
reducing the monetary base (𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) . This implies a restriction in the amount of credit 
loans by the banking sector (negative credit gap) and a further output decrease. Therefore, if we 
would consider the reaction of monetary policy alone, a negative demand shock would have a 
17 
 
harming effect on the GDP and would yield to deflationary pressures. The only way to inhibit 
the decrease in the output is through a countercyclical fiscal policy (higher primary deficit and 
debt ratio) as is observed in the corresponding IRF, in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 1. – Impact of a negative demand shock in % on the GDP in South Africa and Ghana                                 
                                           
Figure 2. - Reactions to a negative demand shock respectively of inflation, interest rate, credit, 
real exchange rate, primary balance and debt ratio in % in South Africa  
 
Figure 3.- Reaction to a negative demand shock respectively of inflation, interest rate, credit, 
real exchange rate, primary balance and debt ratio in % in Ghana 
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 Figure 4.  Impact of a negative demand shock in % on the GDP in WAEMU 
                                                  
Figure 5. - Reaction to a negative demand shock respectively of inflation, ratio of domestic 
assets, credit, real exchange rate, primary balance and debt ratio in % in WAEMU. 
 
 Table 1 summarizes the main properties of the policies. The monetary authorities in Ghana 
and South Africa are able to respond to a negative demand shock by lessening the decrease in 
production (through interest rate cuts), while the task is proved more difficult in the WAEMU 
countries (the money supply is endogenous and responds passively to changes in the demand 
for money). The currency board seems to be a disadvantage in itself since the countercyclical 
policy needed to attenuate the impact of the shock relies entirely on fiscal policy. Therefore, 
the stabilization of the output-gap after a given negative demand shock may require a larger 
change in the fiscal policy under a currency board regime than under inflation targeting 
(compare Ghana and the WAEMU). This leads excess government debt (the debt ratio is 
higher and its dynamics more persistent in the WAEMU than in Ghana). To sum up, the IRFs 
provide arguments in favor of an active fiscal policy in both Ghana and the WAEMU, but for 
different reasons. In Ghana, the fiscal policy amplify the reaction of monetary policy. In the 
WAEMU, it is a good substitute for the passive monetary policy (at the cost of a higher public 
indebtedness).  
However, the story is different if we compare South Africa with Ghana. In the former country, 
the interest rate cut is higher and last a longer period, thereby explaining the importance of the 
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credit channel in dampening the effects of the shocks on the output. Per se, the monetary policy 
would be enough to cope with the shock. The additional countercyclical reaction of the fiscal 
policy translates into an excess and persistent public debt ratio. This would militate against the 
use of fiscal policy in addition to monetary policy.   
 
Table 1.- Main properties of the policies when reacting to a negative demand shock 
Monetary policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal policy 
 
 
 
 
 
●Persistent effects on credits in South Africa: source of higher variability 
of the output. 
●Stabilizing properties on the output under inflation targeting, but de-
stabilizing effects under currency board. 
●Higher variability of the output under inflation targeting (because is a 
complement to fiscal policy) than under currency board (because the 
negative shock yields a contraction of the money supply). 
●In South Africa, higher variability of the output than in Ghana, because 
cuts in the interest rate are of a higher magnitude and more persistent over 
time). 
●In South Africa, inflation targeting induces a higher cost in terms of the 
level and dynamics of the public debt ratio 
 
●Cost in terms of public debt ratio under currency board 
●Stabilizing properties on production, but increases the variability of the 
output under inflation targeting 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Reactions to a positive shock to inflation 
 
Table 2 summarizes the properties of the policy-mix under both inflation targeting and 
currency board after a positive shock to inflation. An interesting feature is that inflation 
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targeting stabilizes both inflation and the output, while the currency board regime yields to de-
stabilizing effects, thereby implying a higher variability of these variables.  
 
South Africa and Ghana 
The effects are shown in Figures 6 till 8. A positive inflation shock causes the inflation rate to 
go above its target value, thereby implying an initial raise in the interest rate by the CB. This 
reduces the GDP below its equilibrium value (negative output gap) since credits to the 
economy are restricted (negative credit gap). 
However, a few periods after the initial growth decrease, the CB changes the orientation of its 
monetary policy by lowering the interest rate. This moderates the declines in the output, and in 
the inflation rate till these variables return to their equilibrium level. The dynamics of the real 
exchange rate is accordingly characterized by an appreciation followed by a depreciation. 
The results shown here, for Ghana and South Africa, suggests that their CB cope with inflation 
pressures by adopting a two-step approach. Following the initial increase in the general level of 
prices, the CB proceeds to a large cut in the interest rate, implying the additional inflation to 
die out quickly, but at the cost of an output reduction and a higher debt ratio.  
Then, in a second step, the monetary authorities search to prevent a too strong GDP decrease 
by providing a stimulus through a moderate interest rate decrease. Such a behavior from the 
CB is illustrative of flexible inflation targeting rather than a strict inflation targeting policy in 
the sense that these countries aim at stabilizing both inflation and the output, by keeping the 
output around its targeted level. A flexible inflation target policy helps in the policy-mix by 
allowing fiscal policy to be countercyclical. This is illustrated for instance in Figure 8 for 
Ghana where the reaction of the primary balance to the inflation shocks is characterized by a 
fiscal consolidation (increase in fiscal balance, when the GDP decrease dies out). This helps 
limiting the increase in the debt ratio. 
These finding contradicts a widespread view according to which, in the developing countries, a 
monetary tightening in response to inflation shocks yields to explosive debt dynamics when 
fiscal policy responds in a countercyclical manner to negative shocks11. Here, a flexible 
inflation targeting policy implies that the interest rate is raised when inflation goes above its 
11 See Loyo (1999). 
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target, and is then cut once the output goes below its target. Per se, the adjustment of the 
interest rate alone could be enough to stabilize the output and reduce its variability.   
The initial shock dissipates more slowly in South Africa than in Ghana. Indeed, insofar as the 
coefficient 𝜌3 associated with the exchange rate in the Taylor rule is small (0.04), this 
country’s situation is that of a standard inflation targeting regime in a closed economy. When, 
however, as is the case in Ghana, the real exchange rate enters as a key argument of the Taylor 
rule (𝜌3 equals 0.7), the so-called "divine coincidence" situation does not apply. Indeed, to 
stabilize the output-gap, the central bank cannot control the inflation rate solely, but must also 
ensure simultaneously that the exchange rate moves in the right direction. As shown by the 
empirical studies, in some countries including Ghana, the central banks, while pursuing a 
policy of inflation targeting, also intervene in foreign exchange markets when the exchange 
rate deviates from its target. These intervention modifies the exchange reserves, and thus the 
money supply and in turn affect the interest rates. In Ghana, the monetary policy response to 
the initial shock thus affects aggregate demand, not only through a direct interest rate channel, 
but also through an exchange rate channel (the addition of both effects increases the magnitude 
of the central bank’s reaction to the inflation shock which dies out faster than in South Africa). 
In Ghana, the exchange rate is used in lieu of the fiscal policy to attenuate the effects of the 
shock on the output. Accordingly, the public debt ratio dies out rapidly, while in South Africa 
it does not because the fiscal policy is strongly countercyclical over the entire period.  
 
WAEMU 
The effects of a positive inflation shock is depicted in Figures 9 and 10. An increase in 
inflation yields an increase in the demand for money. The CB responds to the higher demand 
by buying assets in the money markets which increases the monetary base and the money 
supply. This results in a higher amount of distributed credits by the banking sector, which 
boosts the output above its equilibrium level. As shown in Figure 10, the changes in assets and 
credit have a persistent effect on production. This has a destabilizing effect on inflation, 
because prices grow as the result of increasing demand. In this case fiscal policy matter to 
control the mean-reverting dynamics of inflation. The initial shock is removed by a restrictive 
fiscal policy or a fiscal consolidation (increase in the budget balance gap). The result is a 
decrease in the debt ratio. Therefore, the economic imbalances that results from a positive 
supply shock (higher inflation and output) are aggravated by the monetary policy and the only 
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possible mechanism to reverse this is to reduce public demand through a restrictive fiscal 
policy. So it is important that fiscal policy is not “deviant” in the WAEMU countries and that 
the government achieves fiscal surpluses for not contribution to aggravate inflation. If public 
spending is primarily directed towards traded goods (an assumption implying that 𝜔4 in 
Equation (6c) is negative), fiscal consolidation yields an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(positive exchange rate gap). This further contributes to reduce both inflation and the output.  
 
Figure 6. – Impact of a positive inflation shock in % on inflation in South Africa and Ghana       
                                           
Figure 7.- Reactions to a positive inflation shock respectively of interest rate, credit, output, 
real exchange rate, primary balance and debt ratio in % in South Africa 
 
Figure 8.- Reactions to a positive inflation shock respectively of interest rate, credit, output, 
real exchange rate, primary balance and debt ratio in % in Ghana. 
 
23 
 
Figure 9.- Impact of a positive inflation shock in % in the WAEMU 
                                                   
Figure 10.- Reaction to a positive inflation shock respectively of ratio of domestic assets, 
credit, output, real exchange rate, primary fiscal balance and debt in % in the WAEMU 
 
Table 2.- Main properties of the policies when reacting to a positive inflation shock 
Monetary policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal policy 
 
 
 
 
 
●Under inflation targeting, lowers the variability of the output through a two-step 
approach: an increase in followed by a cut of the interest rates. Under a currency 
board regime, the policy has de-stabilizing effects on both inflation and the output, 
thereby implying a higher variability of both variables.  
●The use of two instruments, namely the interest rate and policy intervention in 
the foreign exchange markets reduces the persistence of the output dynamics in 
Ghana compared with what happens in South Africa. 
 
●Stabilizing effects on the public debt ratio in Ghana and in the WAEMU, but not 
in South Africa (policy strongly countercyclical) 
●Under currency board, helps stabilizing inflation and output through a fiscal 
consolidation 
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 3.3.3 Reactions to a negative shock to primary balance 
 
South Africa and Ghana 
The effects are shown in Figures 11 till 13. A negative shock to the primary balance boosts the 
economy by increasing the output. The increased output raises the inflation rate which is 
fought by an increase in the interest rate. This in turn reduces the volume of credits and 
therefore slows the output increase.  
Moreover, the shock shifts the debt ratio upward and the latter is curbed by higher in primary 
surpluses or a policy of fiscal consolidation. The latter cancels the increase in production, and 
even decreases in the output and inflation rate are observed. In turn, the monetary authorities 
respond by interest rate cuts. The induced effects are those of an expansionary monetary 
policy, specifically higher credits and a real exchange rate appreciation leading the output and 
the inflation rate back to their equilibrium level.  
A negative shock to the primary balance thus yields to policy reactions that differ from those 
induced by a negative aggregate demand shock. Here, fiscal policy leads to a depressive effect 
on production, which is more pronounced as the government’s fiscal sustainability constraint is 
strong. For instance, we see that the coefficient that measures the response of the primary 
balance to expected changes in the debt ratio debt is very high in Ghana (0.82) compared to its 
value in South Africa (0.03). This motivates a two-step reaction of the monetary authorities, 
once to stabilize inflation by preventing price increases induced by the negative shock on the 
primary balance, then a second time to stabilize production and prevent it falling. 
  
 
 WAEMU 
The impacts are graphed in Figures 14 and 15. In WAEMU, the shock also yields a higher debt 
ratio and increases production. This results in a decrease in inflation. Once again, to slow down 
the increase in the debt ratio, the government needs to increase its primary balance, which 
negatively impact the output growth and implies that the Central bank reacts by buying more 
assets in order to increase the liquidity in the economy and allow a higher amount of credits 
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distributed by the banking sector to slow down the induced decrease in the output till it goes 
back to its equilibrium level. As a result, monetary policy is oriented in the same direction as in 
South Africa and Ghana, being expansionary to counteract the negative effects on the activity 
of the fiscal sustainability constraint. The difference arises only in the instrument used, namely 
interest rates in one case, and the central bank’s balance sheet in the second case. 
 
Figure 11.- Impact of primary fiscal balance shock in % on the primary surplus : South Africa 
and Ghana                                                                                                          
                                            
Figure 12.-Impact of a negative shock on primary balance on respectively inflation, interest 
rate, credit, debt, real exchange rate and output in % in South Africa. 
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Figure 13.-Impact of a negative shock on primary balance on respectively inflation, interest 
rate, credit, debt, real exchange rate and output in % in Ghana 
 
The properties of the policies are summarized in Table 3.  
 
Table 3.- Main properties of the policies when reacting to a negative fiscal shock 
Monetary policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal policy 
 
 
 
 
●No difference between inflation targeting and currency board regimes. The 
policy is expansionary to counteract the negative effect of fiscal consolidation on 
the output.   
● In both regimes, monetary and fiscal policies work in opposite directions, 
thereby limiting the variability of inflation and of the output. 
 
● The policy is restrictive in order to reduce the public debt ratio: stabilizing 
effects on both inflation and the output 
 
Figure 14.- Impact of primary fiscal balance shock in % on the primary surplus : WAEMU                                                                                                          
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Figure 15.-Impact of a negative shock on primary balance on respectively inflation, interest 
rate, credit, debt, real exchange rate and output in % : WAEMU 
 
4.-Conclusion 
The tougher issue today in Africa is the choice among two nominal anchors: inflation targeting 
or exchange rate pegging. A widespread view among central bankers and academics is that the 
first policy makes a difference in regard to its ability to attenuate the volatility of the output 
and of inflation and to lead to a fall in inflation level. However, the example of the CFA zone 
countries suggests that pegging the domestic currency to that of a low inflation country also 
contributes to keeping inflation under control. Further, such a peg does not necessarily leaves 
the WAEMU countries opened to speculative attacks because of the “insurance” mechanism by 
the French Treasury. Our paper suggests that, when the policies are compared in terms of their 
ability to eliminate the negative effects of the shocks facing the countries, there is no clear 
evidence of a predominance of one regime over the other.    
Our results are summarized in Table 4. They do indicate the inability of a currency board 
regime to perform well when used to fight negative demand shocks and positive shocks to 
inflation. Its efficiency in reducing the variability of inflation and output is small relative to its 
de-stabilizing effects because the changes in assets moves in the wrong direction to stabilize 
the effects of the shocks. The adjustments prove successful only if fiscal adjustment is 
employed as a substitute for monetary policy. Inflation targeting policy is more successful in 
this regard, playing in a straightforward way when the economy is hit by a positive supply 
shock: monetary policy has all the good properties (stabilizing effects, low variability, low 
persistence of the shock). There is, however, evidence of a poor performance when used to 
remove the effects of a negative demand shock: the effects of the latter tends to be persistent, 
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inflation and the output exhibit a high variability and it is also clear that the policy in costly in 
terms of public debt ratio.  
The usefulness of both monetary regimes in an attempt to lean against a negative primary 
balance shock is justified by their advantage in countering the effects of a restrictive fiscal 
policy.  
To sum up, both policies seem inappropriate to help the economies exiting from the effects of 
negative demand shocks (the adjustment relies mainly on fiscal policy), both are essential when 
negative shocks to primary balance occur (fiscal policy aggravates the negative effects of the 
shocks), while inflation targeting dominates the currency board regime as a strategy to cope 
with positive shocks to inflation.  
 
Table 4.- Effects on output and inflation of inflation targeting and currency board 
 Negative demand shock Positive shock to 
inflation 
Negative shock to 
primary balance 
 
 
Inflation targeting 
-Stabilizing effect 
-Higher volatility 
-High persistence of the 
shock 
-Costly in terms of public 
debt ratio 
-Stabilizing effect 
-Low variability 
-Low persistence of the 
shock 
-Stabilizing effects 
-Low variability 
-Low variability of the 
shock 
Conclusion Monetary and fiscal policies 
are complements (but at the 
cost of a higher debt ratio 
Monetary policy alone 
would be enough 
Expansionary 
monetary policy 
needed as a substitute 
for restrictive fiscal 
policy 
 
 
 
Currency board 
-De-stabilizing effects 
-Lower variability 
-Lower persistence of the 
shock 
-costly in terms of debt ratio 
-De-stabilizing effects 
-High persistence of 
the shock 
-Low variability 
-Stabilizing effects 
-Low variability 
-Low persistence of the 
shocks 
Conclusion Fiscal policy enough  Contractionary fiscal 
policy needed 
Expansionary 
monetary policy 
needed as a substitute 
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for restrictive fiscal 
policy 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Ghana and South Africa 
The model is given by the following equations:  
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + (1 − 𝛽1)(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑡−1∗ ) + 𝛽3(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡∗)                          −𝛽4(𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡∗) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡∗) + 𝛽6(𝑦𝑡𝑊 − 𝑦𝑡𝑊∗) + 𝜀𝑡𝑦  (1) 
𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
∗ = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡∗) + 𝛿2(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜀𝑡𝐶 (2a) 
𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡
∗ = 𝜃0 + 𝜃2(𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜃3𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃4(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗) + 𝜃5(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡𝑏  (3) 
𝑑𝑡 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑏𝑡,   (4) 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑚0 + (1 −𝑚1){𝛼1𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼3(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)} + 𝑚1(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡𝜋       (5) 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1(𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝜋𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜌2(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜌3(𝑧𝑡−1 − 𝑧𝑡−1∗ ) + 𝜀𝑡𝑟 (7a) 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝜔3𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏𝑡 + 𝜔5(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐹) + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 (7b) 
 
We define 𝑋�𝑡 =  𝑋𝑡 −  𝑋𝑡∗: 
𝑦�𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑡[𝑦�𝑡+1] +  (1 − 𝛽1)𝑦�𝑡−1 + 𝛽3?̃?𝑡−1 − 𝛽4𝑏�𝑡 + 𝛽5?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑦�𝑡𝑤 + 𝜀𝑡𝑦 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1?̃?𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑡[𝑦�𝑡+1] + 𝜀𝑡𝑐 
𝑏�𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜃3𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑦�𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝑏 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 + 𝜆)?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝑏�𝑡+1 
𝜋�𝑡 = 𝑚0 + (1 −𝑚1){𝛼1𝐸𝑡𝜋�𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝜋�𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑦�𝑡} + 𝑚1∆𝑧𝑡 + [(1 −𝑚1)(𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − 1]𝜋𝑡∗+ 𝜀𝑡𝜋 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝐸𝑡𝜋�𝑡+1 + 𝜌2𝐸𝑡𝑦�𝑡+1 + 𝜌3?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑟 
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∆𝑧𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 +  𝜔3𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏�𝑡 + 𝜔5(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐹) − 𝑧𝑡∗ − ?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜔4𝑏𝑡∗+ 𝜀𝑡𝑧 
For Ghana and South Africa the model can be cast in the following form: 
𝐵0𝑌𝑡= 𝐴0+ 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1+ Δ𝑋𝑡 + C𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1 + 𝜁𝑈𝑡     ,     𝑈𝑡 = 𝛷𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑡 
Where: 
𝑌𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝑏�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝜋�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, Δ𝑧𝑡),                     𝐸𝑡 , = (𝜀𝑡𝑦, 𝜀𝑡𝑐, 𝜀𝑡𝑏 , 0, 𝜀𝑡𝜋, 𝜀𝑡𝑟 , 𝜀𝑡𝑧) 
𝑋𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡𝑤,𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡,𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡,𝜋𝑡∗, ?̃?𝑡−1, 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 ,  𝑏𝑡∗, 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐹) 
𝑣𝑡 is a 7x1 vector of i.i.d. innovations 𝐴1,𝐴2,𝐵 are 7x7 matrices, c is a 7x10 matrix , 
𝐴0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑡 are a 7x1 vectors 
C=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝛽1 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝛿2 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 𝜃2 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 (1 −𝑚1)𝛼1 0 𝑚1
𝜌2 0 0 0 𝜌1 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 1 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
  
 
𝐵0=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1 −𝛽5 𝛽4 0 0 0 00 1 1 1 1 𝛿1 0
−𝜃4 0 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 1 0 0 0
−(1 −𝑚1)𝛼3 0 0 0 1 0 −𝑚10 0 0 0 0 1 00 0 −𝜔4 0 0 0 1 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
A′0 = (β0, δ0, θ0, 0, m0, ρ0,ω0) 
𝐵1=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1 − 𝛽1 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 (1 + 𝜆) 0 0 00 0 0 0 (1 −𝑚1)𝛼2 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
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D=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝛽1 0 0 0 𝛽3 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 𝜃3 𝜃5 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 𝑐1 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 𝜌3 0 0 0 0 00 0 𝜔2 0 −1 𝜔1 𝜔3 𝜔5 𝜔4 −1⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
    𝑐1 = (1 −𝑚1)(𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − 1 
 
𝜑=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝜑𝑦 0 0 0 0 0 00 𝜑𝑐 0 0 0 0 00 0 𝜑𝑏 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 𝜑𝜋 0 00 0 0 0 0 𝜑𝑟 00 0 0 0 0 0 𝜑𝑧⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
P is found to be for Ghana (with the calibrated parameters): 
𝑃=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1.9740 0 0 0.0190 0.0618 0 04.2339 0 0 0.0715 0.1438 0 00.6027 0 0 0.0324 0.0187 0 0
−0.6027 0 0 0.9376 −0.0187 0 0
−6.9423 0 0 −0.1392 0.0630 0 0
−4.7783 0 0 −0.0925 −0.1539 0 0
−3.5320 0 0 −0.0724 −0.1019 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
For South Africa: 
𝑃=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.2307 0 0 −0.0143 −0.0124 0 0
−0.0038 0 0 −0.0031 −0.0357 0 00.0735 0 0 0.0223 −0.0039 0 0
−0.0735 0 0 0.9477 0.0039 0 00.0734 0 0 0 0.3051 0 00.0618 0 0 −0.0112 0.0631 0 00.0140 0 0 0.0042 −0.0007 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
For WAEMU, we have a similar system : 
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + (1 − 𝛽1)(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑡−1∗ ) + 𝛽3(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡∗)                          −𝛽4(𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡∗) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡∗) + 𝛽6(𝑦𝑡𝑊 − 𝑦𝑡𝑊∗) + 𝜀𝑡𝑦                     (1) 
𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
∗ = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1(𝑎𝑡) + 𝛿2(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜀𝑡𝐶  (2b) 
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𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡
∗ = 𝜃0 + 𝜃2(𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1∗ ) + 𝜃3𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃4(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗) + 𝜃5(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡𝑏  (3) 
𝑑𝑡 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑏𝑡,   (4) 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑚0 + (1 −𝑚1){𝛼1𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼3(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)} + 𝑚1(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡𝜋       (5) 
𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎0 − 𝜑1𝑓𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑1){𝜑2(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1) + 𝜑3(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡−1) + 𝜑4ℎ𝑡 + 𝜑5𝜋𝑡} + 𝜀𝑡𝑎 (6b) 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝜔3𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 (6c) 
 
We define 𝑋�𝑡 =  𝑋𝑡 −  𝑋𝑡∗ : 
𝑦�𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑡[𝑦�𝑡+1] +  (1 − 𝛽1)𝑦�𝑡−1 + 𝛽3?̃?𝑡−1 − 𝛽4𝑏�𝑡 + 𝛽5?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑦�𝑡𝑤 + 𝜀𝑡𝑦 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛿0 − 𝛿1?̃?𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑡[𝑦�𝑡+1] + 𝜀𝑡𝑐 
𝑏�𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 + 𝜃3𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑦�𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝑏 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 + 𝜆)?̃?𝑡+1 − 𝑏�𝑡+1 
𝜋�𝑡 = 𝑚0 + (1 −𝑚1){𝛼1𝐸𝑡𝜋�𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝜋�𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑦�𝑡} + 𝑚1∆𝑧𝑡 + [(1 −𝑚1)(𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − 1]𝜋𝑡∗+ 𝜀𝑡𝜋 
𝑎�𝑡 = 𝑎0 − 𝜑1𝑓𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑2𝑦�𝑡 − 𝜑2(1 − 𝜑1)𝑦�𝑡−1 +(1 − 𝜑1)𝜌3?̃?𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑5𝜋�𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑4ℎ𝑡 + (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑5𝜋𝑡+∗ 𝜀𝑡𝑎 
∆𝑧𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 +  𝜔3𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏�𝑡 + 𝜔4𝑏𝑡∗ − 𝑧𝑡∗ − ?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 
 
The model can be cast in the following form: 
𝐵0𝑌𝑡= 𝐴0+ 𝐶 𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1+ B𝑌𝑡−1 + D𝑋𝑡 + 𝐷𝐸𝑡     ,      
Where: 
𝑌𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , 𝑏�𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , 𝜋�𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, Δ𝑧𝑡) ,             𝐸𝑡 , = (𝜀𝑡𝑦, 𝜀𝑡𝑐, 𝜀𝑡𝑏 , 0, 𝜀𝑡𝜋, 𝜀𝑡𝑎, 𝜀𝑡𝑧) 
𝑋𝑡 , = (𝑦�𝑡𝑤,𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡,𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡,𝜋𝑡∗, ?̃?𝑡−1, 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 ,  𝑏𝑡∗, 𝑓𝑡, ℎ𝑡, ∆𝑟𝑡, 𝑧𝑡∗) The matrices 𝐴0,𝐵0,𝐵1,𝐶,𝐷 are defined as follows: 
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𝐵0=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1 −𝛽5 𝛽4 0 0 0 00 1 1 1 1 𝛿1 0
−𝜃4 0 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 1 0 0 0
−(1 −𝑚1)𝛼3 0 0 0 1 0 −𝑚1
−(1 − 𝜑1)𝜑2 0 0 0 −(1 − 𝜑1)𝜑5 1 00 0 −𝜔4 0 0 0 1 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
𝐶=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝛽1 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝛿2 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 𝜃2 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 (1 −𝑚1)𝛼1 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
𝐵1=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1 − 𝛽1 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 (1 + 𝜆) 0 0 00 0 0 0 (1 −𝑚1)𝛼2 0 0
−𝜑2(1 − 𝜑1) 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
D=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝛽4 0 0 0 𝛽3 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 𝜃3 𝜃5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 𝑐1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑5 0 0 0 0 −𝜑1 (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑4 (1 − 𝜑1)𝜑3 00 0 𝜔2 0 −1 𝜔1 𝜔3 𝜔4 0 0 0 −1⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
    
where 𝑐1 = (1 −𝑚1)(𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − 1 
 A′0 = (β0, δ0, θ0, 0, m0, ρ0,ω0) 
And Finally P was found to be (with the calibration of the parameters): 
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𝑃=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.9400 0 0 −0.0078 0.0005 0 00.0887 0 0 −0.0014 0.0013 0 00.1199 0 0 0.0082 0.0001 0 0
−0.1199 0 0 0.9618 −0.0001 0 00.0486 0 0 0.0006 −0.0739 0 0
−0.0005 0 0 −0.0002 −0.0020 0 00.0240 0 0 0.0016 0 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table B1: Equilibrium values 
   Ghana South Africa WAEMU 
Real exchange rate index 96.81 91.63 100.39 
Credit ratio as share of GDP (%) 28.04 79.98 18.41 
Debt ratio as share of GDP (%) 70 50 70 
Primary balance as share of GDP (%) -4 -1.7 -2 
𝜆 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
Inflation (%) 5 6 2 
 
Table B2: Calibration of the parameters 
 Ghana South Africa WAEMU 
Aggregate Demand Parameters 
𝛽1: Weight forecast output gap  0.1
16 0.05 12 0.116 
𝛽2: lagged output gap
 0.7513,16 0.70 8 0.7516 
 
12 Taken from Harjes and Ricci (2008). 
 
13 Taken from Alpanda et al. (2011).  
15 Taken from Fielding et al. (2012). For credit, we consider the elasticity of the growth rate with respect to 
money growth, and we take the average of the coefficients of the WAEMU countries. We consider the same 
value for Ghana and South Africa. 
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𝛽3: real exchange gap elasticity 0.1
16 0.05 8 1.314 
𝛽4: Fiscal gap elasticity 0.44
16 0.55 0.716 
𝛽5: Credit gap elasticity 0.4015 0.4015 0.4015 
𝛽6: World output gap 0.25
16 0.20 8 0.4415 
Taylor Rule 
𝜌1: taylor rule inflation 2.516 0.73 20F9 _ 
𝜌2: taylor rule output gap 0.516 0.62 9 _ 
𝜌3: taylor rule real exchange rate 0.716 0.04 9 _ 
Currency board parameters 
𝜑1: net foreign asset ratio _ _ 0.517 
𝜑2: output gap _ _ 0.0617 
𝜑3: interest rate _ _ 0.317 
𝜑4: money multiplier _ _ 0.1517 
𝜑5: Inflation _ _ 0.5517 
Credit parameters 
𝛿1: interest rate/domestic asset  0.917 0.617 0.5117 
𝛿2: output gap 0.0617 0.117 0.3217 
Standard Deviation of shocks 
𝜎𝑦: aggregate demand 0.2717 0.2917 0.2417 
𝜎𝑐: Credit 0.26917 0.3417 0.6317 
𝜎𝑏: fiscal balance 0.09617 0.00917 0.2617 
𝜎𝜋: domestic inflation 0.2617 0.0817 0.1717 
𝜎𝑟/𝑎: Monetary policy 0.3017 0.2617 0.3717 
𝜎𝑧: Real exchange rate 0.03117 0.04317 0.0617 
16 Taken from Dagher et al. (2010).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
                                                          
Aggregate supply parameters 
𝑚1: 0.316 0.28 9 0.514 
𝛼2: past domestic inflation 0.916 0.37 9 −0.1516 
𝛼1: expected future inflation 0.116 0.63 9 0.4016 
𝛼3: output gap 0.316 0.308 0.0614 
Fiscal reaction function parameters 
𝜃2: forecast debt ratio 0.610 0.03 11 0.0112 
𝜃3: aid −0.110 −0.110 −0.114 
𝜃4: output gap 0.1717 0.33 15 0.1312 
𝜃5:TOT 0.8516,17 −0.4517 −0.0117 
Real Exchange rate Parameters 
𝜔1: openness −0.0713   0.1917 −0.0713 
𝜔2: TOT 0.3113 0.5517 0.3113 
𝜔3: relative productivity 0.813 0.4417 0.80 13 
𝜔4: Fiscal balance −0.213 0.1917 −0.2018 
𝜔5:interest rate differential 0.02517 0.0817 - 
 
Table B3 : Calibration of  intercepts 
   Ghana South Africa WAEMU 
𝛽0 0.81061 -1.27588 1.35742 
𝜌0 -0.938232 -0.0497876 2.96745 
14 Chosen from Lledo and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2011). 
 
15 Taken from Burger et al. (2012).  
 
16 Taken from Adedji and Williams (2007) and Fernandez et al. (2011).  
 
17 Calculation Based on available database, for shocks we estimated according to VAR process. 
 
 
18 Chosen from Roudet et al. (2007).  
 
14 See Dembo Toe (2010). 
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𝑚0 0.33462 0.361305 0.368294 
𝜃0 -19.7007 -6.35085 1.65974 
𝛿0 -0.102131 0.174531 1.85577 
𝜔0 2.4287 2.03559 2.05849 
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